Kate Wilson is one of at least 27 women who were deceived into sexual relationships with undercover officers working for units of the Metropolitan Police in the period 1968–2010. Between November 2003 and February 2005, she had a sexual relationship with a man known to her as ‘Mark Stone’, with whom she remained close friends after the relationship ended. In October 2010, Ms Wilson discovered that ‘Mark Stone’ was actually Mark Kennedy, a married undercover officer with two children who was conducting covert surveillance for the Metropolitan Police’s National Public Order Intelligence Unit. Ms Wilson (who has no criminal convictions) subsequently discovered that she had been subject to covert surveillance by at least five other undercover officers over a period of more than 10 years from the late 1990s to 2010. Wilson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and National Police Chiefs’ Council [2021] UKIPTrib IPT_11_167_H, 30 September 2021, followed settlement in the High Court of a claim by Ms Wilson for tortious breaches (deceit, misfeasance in public office, assault, battery and negligence).

The tribunal found a ‘formidable list’ of breaches by the respondents of Ms Wilson’s fundamental rights under ECHR articles 3, 8, 10, 11 and 14, revealing ‘disturbing and lamentable failings at the most fundamental levels’ (para 344). The case represents the first time that the tribunal has made findings of breaches under article 3 and article 14.

The tribunal identified breaches of articles 3 and 8 that were considerably broader than those conceded by the respondents, including because senior officers ‘either knew of the relationship, chose not to know of its existence, or were incompetent and negligent in not following up on the clear and obvious signs’ (para 225), adopting something akin to a ‘Don’t ask don’t tell’ approach (para 226). It concluded that the respondents breached their positive obligation to protect those subject to surveillance from interferences with their ECHR article 8 rights, identifying widespread failures to supervise undercover officers and that the training provided to undercover officers was ‘grossly inadequate’ (para 193).

Additionally, the tribunal found that the authorisations for the undercover operations did not meet a pressing social need and were not necessary in a democratic society, including because the authorisations failed to distinguish between the policing of domestic extremism involving serious criminality and public order policing. No proper consideration was given or structures put in place to limit collateral intrusion into the private lives of persons not named as the subject of surveillance.

Ms Wilson suffered serious breaches of articles 10 and 11 because she was subject to surveillance due to her political views and because Mr Kennedy took steps to directly influence her political opinions and movements. These acts were freestanding violations of articles 10 and 11 that were not in accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society or proportionate, notwithstanding that they also constituted breaches of articles 3 and 8.

This significant judgment is the culmination of 10 years of legal action by Ms Wilson, whose tenacity and perseverance in pursuing her claim has brought to light fundamental failings on the part of the Metropolitan Police. Many of the tribunal’s key factual findings – particularly regarding failures of training, supervision and safeguarding, and to properly consider issues of collateral intrusion, impact on women and intrusion on political activities – will be of broader relevance both to the ongoing work of the Undercover Policing Inquiry and its core participants. The judgment will also require the Metropolitan Police to reflect carefully on the criticisms levelled against it and respond with real change, both to the way it conducts its undercover operations and to the way it conducts litigation against victims of human rights abuses.