201. Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour.

202. Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 . The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.

203. Treatment has been held by the court to be ‘inhuman’ because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. Treatment has been considered ‘degrading’ when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance or driving them to act against their will or conscience. In this connection, the question whether such treatment was intended to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, although the absence of any such purpose does not inevitably lead to a finding that there has been no violation of Article 3.

204. The suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element. Yet it cannot be said that deprivation of liberty in itself raises an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, under that article the state must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance.

205. When assessing the conditions of a deprivation of liberty under Article 3 of the Convention, account has to be taken of their cumulative effects and the duration of the measure in question. In this connection, an important factor to take into account, besides the material conditions, is the detention regime. In assessing whether a restrictive regime may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 in a given case, regard must be had to the particular conditions, the stringency of the regime, its duration, the objective pursued and its effects on the person concerned.

206. In the present case the court has found that the applicant’s placement in the Pastra Social Care Home–a situation for which the domestic authorities must be held responsible–amounts to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. It follows that Article 3 is applicable to the applicant’s situation, seeing that it prohibits the inhuman and degrading treatment of anyone in the care of the authorities. The court would emphasise that the prohibition of ill-treatment in Article 3 applies equally to all forms of deprivation of liberty, and in particular makes no distinction according to the purpose of the measure in issue; it is immaterial whether the measure entails detention ordered in the context of criminal proceedings or admission to an institution with the aim of protecting the life or health of the person concerned.

207. The court notes at the outset that, according to the Government, the building in which the applicant lives was renovated in late 2009, resulting in an improvement in his living conditions; the applicant did not dispute this. The Court therefore considers that the applicant’s complaint should be taken to refer to the period between 2002 and 2009. The Government has not denied that during that period the applicant’s living conditions corresponded to his description, and have also acknowledged that, for economic reasons, there were certain deficiencies in that regard.

208. The court observes that although the applicant shared a room measuring 16sqm with four other residents, he enjoyed considerable freedom of movement both inside and outside the home, a fact likely to lessen the adverse effects of a limited sleeping area.

209. Nevertheless, other aspects of the applicant’s physical living conditions are a considerable cause for concern. In particular, it appears that the food was insufficient and of poor quality. The building was inadequately heated and in winter the applicant had to sleep in his coat. He was able to have a shower once a week in an unhygienic and dilapidated bathroom. The toilets were in an execrable state and access to them was dangerous, according to the findings by the CPT. In addition, the home did not return clothes to the same people after they were washed, which was likely to arouse a feeling of inferiority in the residents.

210. The court cannot overlook the fact that the applicant was exposed to all the abovementioned conditions for a considerable period of approximately seven years. Nor can it ignore the findings of the CPT, which, after visiting the home, concluded that the living conditions there at the relevant time could be said to amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. Despite having been aware of those findings, during the period from 2002–2009 the Government did not act on its undertaking to close down the institution. The court considers that the lack of financial resources cited by the Government is not a relevant argument to justify keeping the applicant in the living conditions described.

211. It would nevertheless emphasise that there is no suggestion that the national authorities deliberately intended to inflict degrading treatment. However, as noted above, the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3.

212. In conclusion, while noting the improvements apparently made to the Pastra Social Care Home since late 2009, the court considers that, taken as a whole, the living conditions to which the applicant was exposed during a period of approximately seven years amounted to degrading treatment.

213. There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.