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Obtaining evidence
Obtaining evidencesee also Evidence:verbosesee also Evidence:tersesee also Evidence:evasivesee also Evidence:suspected liarsee also Evidence:mental disabilitysee also Evidencesee also Evidence:childrenRe [2007] 2 FLR 461see also Evidence:wearing the veilTimes 11 DecemberRe [1997] 2 FLR 447Re [2010] 1 WLR 701
10.85This section deals mainly with the techniques to use when constructing and asking questions. It also deals with the related matters of summoning witnesses and ordering the production of documents.
Questioning
10.86The subject matter of the questions depends on the nature of the proceedings and is dealt with elsewhere.1See chapter 11 for guidance on the sort of question to ask in particular circumstances. The techniques of questioning are inextricably linked with those of listening.
10.87For convenience, this section will refer only to judges, but its contents apply to all members, whether judges or not. They are also relevant for representatives.
10.88It is likely that at some time all judges in every tribunal will have to question a party or a witness. In some tribunals, the judge will have to ask most, if not all, of the questions. In other tribunals, the judge will only need to ask supplementary questions. The extent to which this is necessary will depend on the nature of the proceedings, the issues that arise, the experience of those parties to the proceedings who are not represented, and the skill of any representative who attends. The judge may have to elicit a coherent statement of evidence from a party who is not represented. It is also likely that a judge will have to ask questions to amplify, clarify or even challenge evidence that has been given.
10.89Questioning must always aim to be effective. When it is undertaken by a judge, it must also aim to be appropriate to the nature of the proceedings and the judge’s role in them.
10.90Questioning by a judge is almost always different from questioning by one of the parties, whether personally or through a representative. A party who calls a witness knows what the witness has to say. Ideally, the questioning will be based on a statement of that evidence. At the least, it will be based on prior knowledge of that evidence. Either way, the purpose of the questioning is to elicit the evidence from the witness in a clear and structured way. This form of questioning to elicit an account is likely to be unnecessary or impossible for judges. Either they will know what the witness is going to say, in which case there is no need for it to be elicited. Or they will not, in which case their questioning cannot be based on knowledge of what the witness has to say.
10.91A party who questions a witness called by the other party has two concerns. One is to discredit any unfavourable evidence given; the other is to extract favourable evidence. Some of the techniques employed in doing so are never appropriate for judges. Their aim must be to elicit evidence that is as complete and as accurate as they can obtain. And they must do so in a way that strives to retain the confidence of the parties, which limits the manner of questioning that is appropriate.
10.92In short, the techniques used by a judge are more likely to resemble those used by an adviser in an initial interview than those used by lawyers in court.
General principles of questioning
10.93The courts recognise the danger that a judge who questions too much may appear to favour one side or the other.2Denning LJ in Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 at 64. Tribunal judges do not always have the luxury of competent representatives to elicit the evidence for them. They regularly have to do it for themselves. They may have to take the lead in questioning or supplement the questions asked by representatives.
10.94But whatever the reason for questions from the tribunal, they must be asked in a way that is consistent with the tribunal’s status as an independent, judicial decision-maker. Judges must not ask questions in a partisan way. Nor should they create the impression that they are doing so. This does not mean that their questions may not challenge the evidence being given; that may be necessary in order to allow the witness to deal with concerns that the judge has about the evidence given. However, the manner in which that is done is important.
10.95As part of the enabling approach to proceedings, the tribunal should try to establish an atmosphere in which the witness will feel responsive and co-operative. This can be done by body language. Adopt an open posture. Maintain eye contact with the witness. But do not stare; that is intimidating. Continuous eye contact is not natural and so is not comfortable. Be attentive to what the witness is saying. Avoid distractions. This approach will be enhanced by the judge taking a neutral approach to questions with a view to obtaining as clear a statement as possible of the party’s case. The use of appropriate techniques of questioning and listening will emphasise that this is what the tribunal is doing. For example: the judge can show that the evidence has been understood by incorporating it into future questions. So, if the tribunal has just heard evidence that the employer was critical of the party’s work, the next question might be: when your employer criticised your work, how did you react?
10.96Style is a personal matter, but a conversational style can be appropriate, provided that it is to a point and not casual or rambling.
10.97Aggression and hostility are not appropriate for a judge. The impression they create is not consistent with impartiality. And they are probably not particularly effective; they may even be counterproductive.
10.98The judge should anticipate how parties may interpret or react to particular questions. They may be offended, embarrassed or just puzzled. They may interpret questions that are challenging as impugning their honesty or integrity. They may interpret the questions as showing that the tribunal has prejudged the case or is biased or predisposed against them. The judge should prevent these problems as far as possible. This can, to some extent at least, be prevented by explaining why the questions have to be asked. It would be tedious and unacceptable to have to justify every question. But sometimes a witness who is reluctant to answer a personal and intimate question, for example, may be willing if the reason for it is explained. And it may help to maintain a good rapport.
10.99Do not ask questions that the witness will have to interpret. This makes it difficult for the witness to answer. It also makes it difficult to assess the answer without knowing how the witness interpreted the question and applied that interpretation. Take as an example this question: ‘How soon after you start walking do you experience severe discomfort?’ This leave the witness to interpret ‘severe discomfort’. And the answer will not disclose what that interpretation was or how the standard set was applied to how the witness felt when walking. It is better to obtain the evidence in a different way, by asking questions that leave no scope for interpretation. For example: ‘How do you feel when you are walking?’
10.100Questions are asked for three reasons and there is a logical order to those reasons. Ask first for information, then to clarify, and finally to probe or test the evidence.
Basic rules of questioning
10.101With those principles in mind, there are some basic rules that can be followed.
10.102Aim to obtain an account of matters relevant to the issues that is as complete and accurate as possible in the circumstances. The purpose of questioning by a judge is not motivated by the self-interest that may affect questioning by the parties.
10.103Know what evidence has to be obtained. Questions can only be framed appropriately if they reflect a clear understanding of the evidence that the tribunal needs.
10.104Ask, do not tell. The purpose of questioning is to obtain from a witness information that is relevant to the proceedings, not to provide information to a witness. It may be necessary to provide some information in order to make a question clear. If so, it should be kept to a minimum.
10.105Ask, do not argue. A question should not be argumentative. It may be appropriate to discuss the evidence with a party or a representative. But this should be kept separate from the task of obtaining the evidence. Get the evidence first, then discuss it.
10.106Stick to what is relevant. Asking irrelevant questions wastes time and may create the impression that the judge does not understand what the proceedings are about.
10.107Ask questions politely and calmly. Avoid emotion. Take a business-like approach. This will help encourage the witness to respond accordingly and help to defuse potential conflict with a witness.
10.108Make the questions clear and precise. Keep questions as short as possible. Use language that the witness will understand and a sentence structure that the witness can follow. In this way, the questioning is likely to be more effective, because the witness will know what information is required.
10.109Ask one thing at a time. Ask a question that combines two or more points, and the chances are that the witness will probably only answer the final point. The other points are likely to go unanswered and the tribunal may form the impression, wrongly, that the witness has evaded answering.
10.110Allow the witness time to answer completely before moving on.
10.111Listen to the answer. This will help to frame the next question.
10.112Give the witness a chance to counter views that the tribunal may be forming from the evidence. Do this by structuring questions in a way that allows, or even encourages, the witness to contradict those views.3Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, McGraw Hill, 1993, Chapter 20, ‘Self-fulfilling Prophecies’, pp239–240.
Eliciting an account
10.113By a process of asking a question, listening to the answer and the framing another question based on the answer, the witness’s evidence will be obtained in an efficient, clear and structured way.
10.114There is likely to be some indication of what a witness is to say. If not, the only approach is to begin with an open question.
10.115Ask an open question to help a witness give a general account. An open question is one that does not narrowly restrict the answer. An example is: what happened at the interview? This leaves the witness to decide what to include and what to leave out. An open question may be relatively wide or narrow in its scope. That has the advantage that it may elicit information that was not previously known and open up new lines of enquiry. But it also has dangers. The witness may leave out relevant material, through not knowing what is relevant. Or the witness may know that something is relevant, but find it easy to leave it out to create a false impression. So, this type of question is more effective if combined with other types, particularly closed questions.
10.116Ask a closed question to elicit information on a specific point. A closed question is one that indicates narrowly what sort of information is required. Sometimes it can be answered with yes or no. Like: did you tell your supervisor about the accident? Sometimes not. Like: how long did you stay away from work? A closed question indicates the sort of information that the answer should contain. Like an open question, it may be relatively wide or narrow in its scope. It does not indicate what the answer should be. This is in contrast to a leading question.
10.117Generally, it is better to avoid asking leading questions on matters that are in dispute. A leading question is one that indicates the answer that is required. Like: you did report that you had started work, didn’t you? Having told the witness what to say, the answer may command less respect, even if it is correct, than if it were elicited differently. This advice is subject to two caveats. First, there may be circumstances in which a relevant question can only be asked in a leading way. If used, leading questions should only be put when other forms of question have been used. Second, it is possible to make too much of the danger of leading questions, as most witnesses are likely to know what evidence is required of them. Strictly, it is only appropriate to classify a question as leading when asked by a representative.4Buxton LJ in Currey v Currey [2005] 1 FLR 952 at [33]. However, the danger is the same whether the question is asked by a representative or by a judge. There are, though, some circumstances in which it is appropriate for a judge to ask a question in a form that leaves the witness in no doubt about the judge’s thinking. This will be appropriate when the judge is putting a provisional view on the evidence to the witness for comment, provided that the parties are given sufficient opportunity to deal with the point raised.5[2005] 1 FLR 952: Thorpe and Buxton LJJ at [18], [20] and [33].
10.118Deal with one point at a time. Only move on when the evidence is complete. Do not ramble randomly from one point to another next. Obtain the evidence in a structured sequence. All this will help the witness to give all relevant evidence and the tribunal to follow the evidence and ensure that something is not overlooked.
Amplification, clarification and challenging
10.119These may be necessary as part of eliciting an account or as a follow-up to evidence given without the tribunal’s assistance.
10.120Ask for elaboration if the evidence appears to be incomplete on its face or the judge suspects that there is more to be said. Like: tell me more about …
10.121Ask for clarification if the evidence is not clear. Attempting a paraphrase of the evidence given may help identify whether or not it has been understood correctly. Like: have I understood you correctly that …?
10.122Challenge evidence if it is inconsistent with, or contradicted by, other evidence or if it seems improbable. The challenge draws attention to the point of concern and provides a chance to deal with it. It is consistent with a neutral approach to the evidence. To emphasise this, the questioning should not be aggressive or hostile. An explanation of the reason for the question can emphasise its relevance and why the witness should have a chance to deal with it.
Particular types of witness or evidence
10.123The verbose witness: concentrate on relatively closed questions. If open questions are necessary or appropriate, limit the scope for freedom of answer. Interrupt the witness in order to focus the answer.
10.124The terse witness: concentrate on relatively open questions. Avoid closed questions that can be answered with only yes or no. Use questions that require fuller or more detailed answers.
10.125The witness who appears to be evasive or avoids answering: persist in requiring an answer to the question. This may show that it was a false impression; the witness may have not understood the question. Use relatively narrow questions, whether open or closed, in order to limit the opportunity to evade or avoid. Persist only as long as necessary to show that the witness will say nothing more specific. It may be appropriate to point out to the witness that the evidence is not clear and allow another chance to be more specific.
10.126The suspected liar.6On the problems with identifying someone who is deliberately lying, see chapter 11. A judge who suspects or believes that a witness is deliberately lying must give the witness a chance to deal with that concern. The judge must already have a basis for suspicion or belief. It may be appropriate to test this further. One way of doing this is to ask more and more detailed questions. This will make it difficult for the witness to invent a story. Another way, which can be used independently of or in conjunction with detailed questions, is to ask the witness to repeat evidence that has been given, preferably in a different order.7‘How to tell a suspect is lying – see if he knows it backwards’ (2007) Times 7 June. This may show discrepancies. Do not, though, expect word perfect repetition. This is itself suspicious. If after this testing the judge remains of the view that the witness may be deliberately lying, this should be put to the witness with reasons. There may be a satisfactory explanation.
10.127The witness who has a mental disability: the tribunal must use language that the witness can understand and avoid certain types of question.8Rebecca Milne and Ray Bull, Investigative Interviewing: Psychology and Practice, Wiley, 1999, chapter 7. There is valuable guidance at www.advocatesgateway.org/toolkits, although it is designed for use in the courts rather than tribunals. Some forms of questioning can produce inaccurate answers from someone with a mental disability. First, some people with a mental disability are likely to answer ‘yes’ to every question. This danger can be avoided by not asking questions that invite a yes or no answer. The better approach is to ask questions in the alternative. So do not ask: do you dress yourself? Instead ask: do you dress yourself or does someone help you? And do not always put the answer first that is more likely or more favourable (or unfavourable); vary between putting it first or second. If the alternative form of question is asked, the alternatives put must be comprehensive of the possibilities. Second, repetition of the same question can suggest that the answer previously given was wrong and lead to the witness giving a different answer. Third, comments to encourage the witness to say more must not limit the information to be given. Saying ‘right’ as a way of encouraging further disclosure seems innocuous, but can suggest that the information given so far is the only type of information that is required. Fourth, avoid the use of personal pronouns. Fifth, make clear when moving from one topic to the next so that the witness is not confused. See further below.
10.128Children. This is unlikely to be necessary in a tribunal, but requires special consideration.9Rebecca Milne and Ray Bull, Investigative Interviewing: Psychology and Practice, Wiley, 1999, chapter 8. See further below.
10.129Wearing the veil. If the witness is prepared to remove the veil, arrangements should be made for the case to be heard by a female panel and to allow the judges to see the witness’s expression and demeanour while ensuring that her face cannot be seen by any males present.10Re S (Practice: Muslim Women Giving Evidence) [2007] 2 FLR 461 at [15]–[17].
Cross-examination
10.130The cross-examination of witnesses may be inappropriate in the context of a particular tribunal. It may be discouraged or even prohibited under the tribunal’s power to regulate its own procedure.11The manner in which evidence is obtained and presented is part of the procedure: see para 10.41. This is so for a number of reasons.
10.131First, the aggressive tone and manner that may, but need not, be associated with cross-examination may be inconsistent with the atmosphere in which a tribunal seeks to make the parties and their witnesses feel comfortable and able to give of their best.12The so-called enabling approach: see chapter 1.
10.132Second, despite judicial support for the value of cross-examination,13Lord Bridge in R v Blastland [1986] AC 41 at 54; Pill LJ in Dyason v Secretary of State for the Environment (1998) 75 P&CR 506 at 512. there is an argument that the traditional approach to cross-examination is not an effective method of getting to the truth.14Jill Hunter, ‘Battling a Good Story: Cross-examining the Failure of the Law of Evdence’ in Paul Roberts and Mike Redmayne (eds), Innovations in Evidence and Proof, Hart Publishing, 2008.
10.133Third, it may be inconsistent with the essentially inquisitorial nature and philosophy of the tribunal.15See chapter 1.
10.134If there is no cross-examination, the tribunal must compensate for this through its inquisitorial approach. As Pill LJ explained in Dyason v Secretary of State for the Environment16(1998) 75 P&CR 506. in the context of a planning appeal:
If cross-examination disappears, the need to examine propositions in that way does not disappear with it … The absence of an accusatorial procedure places an inquisitorial burden upon an Inspector.17(1998) 75 P&CR 506 at 512.
10.135As already explained, the traditional style of cross-examination is not appropriate for judges to undertake. In the absence of express pro-vision, it is for the tribunal to decide whether the parties should be allowed to employ it. The tribunal may, through its power to regulate its own procedure, direct the parties on the style of questioning that is acceptable.
Children, vulnerable adults and sensitive witnesses
10.136The Upper Tribunal has decided that, in dealing with potential child witnesses, the tribunal must give appropriate significance to a child’s right to be heard under article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 and to have a fair hearing and a family life under articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.18JP v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] UKUT 0275 (AAC); [2015] AACR 2. The judge said that the same principles should govern participation by a child in all jurisdictions, but recognised that their application might vary according to the jurisdiction being exercised.19JP v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] UKUT 0275 (AAC) at [19]; [2015] AACR 2. The Senior President’s practice direction on ‘First Tier and Upper Tribunal – Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Witnesses’ has yet to be revised to take account of the modern authorities discussed in that decision.
10.137The practice direction also requires revision to take account of the amendment to the definition of ‘vulnerable adult’ in the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006.20JH(S) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKUT 0567 (AAC) at [23]–[26].
Witness summons
10.138In order to obtain evidence, it may be necessary to direct a person to attend, to give evidence and to produce documents. These rules do not have specific statutory authority; they are within the traditional meaning of practice and procedure.21See chapter 10. There is a general case management power. UTR r5(3)(d) is illustrative:22See also: GRC Rules r5(3)(d); HESC Rules r5(3)(d); IAC Rules r4(3)(d); Lands Rules r5(3)(d); PC Rules r6(3)(d); SEC Rules r5(3)(d); Tax Rules r5(3)(d); WPAFC Rules r5(3)(d).
(3)In particular, and without restricting the general powers in paragraphs (1) and (2), the Upper Tribunal may–
(d)permit or require a party or another person to provide documents, information, evidence or submissions to the Upper Tribunal or a party; …’
There is also more specific provision. UTR r16 is illustrative:23See also: GRC Rules r16; HESC Rules r16; IAC Rules r15; Lands Rules r18; PC Rules r20; SEC Rules r16; Tax Rules r16; WPAFC Rules r16.
Summoning or citation of witnesses and orders to answer questions or produce documents
16 (1) On the application of a party or on its own initiative, the Upper Tribunal may–
(a)by summons (or, in Scotland, citation) require any person to attend as a witness at a hearing at the time and place specified in the summons or citation; or
(b)order any person to answer any questions or produce any documents in that person’s possession or control which relate to any issue in the proceedings.
(2)A summons or citation under paragraph (1)(a) must–
(a)give the person required to attend 14 days’ notice of the hearing or such shorter period as the Upper Tribunal may direct; and
(b)where the person is not a party, make provision for the person’s necessary expenses of attendance to be paid, and state who is to pay them.
(3)No person may be compelled to give any evidence or produce any document that the person could not be compelled to give or produce on a trial of an action in a court of law in the part of the United Kingdom where the proceedings are due to be determined.
(4)A person who receives a summons, citation or order may apply to the Upper Tribunal for it to be varied or set aside if they did not have an opportunity to object to it before it was made or issued.
(5)A person making an application under paragraph (4) must do so as soon as reasonably practicable after receiving notice of the summons, citation or order.
(6)A summons, citation or order under this rule must–
(a)state that the person on whom the requirement is imposed may apply to the Upper Tribunal to vary or set aside the summons, citation or order, if they did not have an opportunity to object to it before it was made or issued; and
(b)state the consequences of failure to comply with the summons, citation or order.
10.139The application of these powers should reflect the inquisitorial nature of the proceedings.24Inner West London Assistant Deputy Coroner v Channel 4 Television Corporation (2007) Times 11 December.
10.140In MR v CMEC and DM,25[2009] UKUT 283 (AAC) at [8]. the Upper Tribunal distinguished between rule 5(3)(d), which was ‘concerned with case management powers and in particular with the provision of documents, information, evidence or submissions in order to allow the tribunal to regulate its procedure’, and rule 16, which was ‘concerned with the scope of the evidence which can be before the tribunal in order to decide the issues before it’. This seems a fine distinction.
Summoning witnesses
10.141The power to issue a summons may be exercised against a party to the proceedings26R v B County Council ex p P [1991] 1 WLR 221 at 226. as well as others. It must not be used oppressively.27[1991] 1 WLR 221 at 227. In deciding whether to issue a summons, the tribunal should take account of any expenses that a witness would incur in attending.28CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [24].
10.142There is no absolute bar on children giving evidence.29Re W (children) (care proceedings: evidence) [2010] 1 WLR 701. These principles apply:
it must be exercised with caution;30[1991] 1 WLR 221 at 228 and 232–233.
the age of the child will be relevant;31Re P (Witness Summons) [1997] 2 FLR 447 at 454.
the relevant time for judging whether a summons should be issued is when the evidence will be given;32R v Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court ex p D [1997] 1 FLR 683.
a summons should normally only be used if the child is over the age of 12.33Re P (Witness Summons) [1997] 2 FLR 447 at 454. But in R v Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court ex p D [1997] 1 FLR 683 a summons was issued to a child of nine, subject to the condition that his suitability as a witness would be decided at the time he was due to give evidence.
10.143A summons requires a person to attend at a hearing. The definition of ‘hearing’ in UTR r1(3) and its equivalents34See also: GRC Rules r1(3); HESC Rules r1(3); IAC Rules r1(4); Lands Rules r18; PC Rules 1(3); SEC Rules r1(3); Tax Rules r1(3); WPAFC Rules r1(3). allows a person to attend without being physically present:
‘hearing’ means an oral hearing and includes a hearing conducted in whole or in part by video link, telephone or other means of instantaneous two-way electronic communication.
A person does not attend by giving pre-recorded evidence. However, the tribunal has power to direct how the evidence is to be provided,35See: UTR r15(1)(e); GRC Rules r15(1)(g); HESC Rules r15(1)(e); IAC Rules r14(1)(e); Lands Rules r16(1)(e); PC Rules r18(1)(g); SEC Rules r15(1)(e); Tax Rules r15(1)(e); WPAFC Rules r15(1)(e). which could include pre-recording.
10.144In the case of an expert or other professional, it is relevant for the tribunal to consider whether attending to give evidence would disrupt or impede other important work which the expert or other professional has to do.36Society of Lloyd’s v Clementson (No 2) (1996) Times 29 February; CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [24]. In such a case, the tribunal should also consider whether there are other ways alternatives to personal attendance. 37CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [29].
10.144A person who does not wish to be summonsed is not entitled to ignore it.38CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [28]. The proper course is apply for the summons to be set aside and the tribunal should be prepared to treat any letter from the person summonsed as an application for this.39CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [25] and [28]. A witness who is not a party cannot appeal against the decision to issue the summons; the appropriate remedy is judicial review. 40CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [26].
Ordering the production of documents
10.146Production of documents may be required on the date of hearing or before.41Khanna v Lovell White Durrant (a firm) [1995] 1 WLR 121.
10.147An order may only be made against someone who is not a party to the proceedings if production of the document is necessary for disposing of the case or for saving costs.42Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Management plc (No 1) [1993] 1 WLR 837 and 1372.
10.148Documents are not limited to paper documents. UTR r1(3) provides:43See also: GRC Rules r1(3); HESC Rules r1(3); PC Rules 1(3); SEC Rules r1(3); Tax Rules r1(3); WPAFC Rules r1(3).
… ‘document’ means anything in which information is recorded in any form, and an obligation under these Rules to provide or allow access to a document or a copy of a document for any purpose means, unless the Tribunal directs otherwise, an obligation to provide or allow access to such document or copy in a legible form or in a form which can be readily made into a legible form; …
This covers all media that can record evidence or information, such as tape recordings44Grant v Southwestern and County Properties Ltd [1975] Ch 185. and film.45Senior v Holdsworth ex p Independent Television News Ltd [1975] QB 23.
10.149Tax documents are protected from disclosure by a public interest immunity, regardless of whether or not this immunity is claimed by the tax authorities. However, this immunity may be overridden by public interest in the administration of justice. The burden of justifying disclosure is on the person seeking disclosure. In making the decision, the tribunal should have regard to the relevance of the documents and to the necessity of disposing fairly of the case.46See Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 4) [1994] QB 775.
10.150The Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 applies to production of evidence by a bank. Production of a bank statement is not a breach of the bank’s duty of confidentiality to its customer.47Robertson v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1994] 1 WLR 1393. But it is an offence to disclose information relating to the business or other affairs of any person that has only been acquired for the purposes of the Banking Act 1987,48Banking Act 1987 s82 and Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd (in liquidation) v Price Waterhouse (No 2) [1998] Ch 84. unless the person concerned consents or the information is already public.49There are other exceptions, but they are unlikely to be relevant to a tribunal.
 
1     See chapter 11 for guidance on the sort of question to ask in particular circumstances. »
2     Denning LJ in Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 at 64. »
3     Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, McGraw Hill, 1993, Chapter 20, ‘Self-fulfilling Prophecies’, pp239–240. »
4     Buxton LJ in Currey v Currey [2005] 1 FLR 952 at [33]. »
5     [2005] 1 FLR 952: Thorpe and Buxton LJJ at [18], [20] and [33]. »
6     On the problems with identifying someone who is deliberately lying, see chapter 11. »
7     ‘How to tell a suspect is lying – see if he knows it backwards’ (2007) Times 7 June. »
8     Rebecca Milne and Ray Bull, Investigative Interviewing: Psychology and Practice, Wiley, 1999, chapter 7. There is valuable guidance at www.advocatesgateway.org/toolkits, although it is designed for use in the courts rather than tribunals. »
9     Rebecca Milne and Ray Bull, Investigative Interviewing: Psychology and Practice, Wiley, 1999, chapter 8. »
10     Re S (Practice: Muslim Women Giving Evidence) [2007] 2 FLR 461 at [15]–[17]. »
11     The manner in which evidence is obtained and presented is part of the procedure: see para 10.41. »
12     The so-called enabling approach: see chapter 1. »
13     Lord Bridge in R v Blastland [1986] AC 41 at 54; Pill LJ in Dyason v Secretary of State for the Environment (1998) 75 P&CR 506 at 512. »
14     Jill Hunter, ‘Battling a Good Story: Cross-examining the Failure of the Law of Evdence’ in Paul Roberts and Mike Redmayne (eds), Innovations in Evidence and Proof, Hart Publishing, 2008. »
15     See chapter 1. »
16     (1998) 75 P&CR 506. »
17     (1998) 75 P&CR 506 at 512. »
18     JP v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] UKUT 0275 (AAC); [2015] AACR 2. »
19     JP v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] UKUT 0275 (AAC) at [19]; [2015] AACR 2. »
20     JH(S) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKUT 0567 (AAC) at [23]–[26]. »
21     See chapter 10. »
22     See also: GRC Rules r5(3)(d); HESC Rules r5(3)(d); IAC Rules r4(3)(d); Lands Rules r5(3)(d); PC Rules r6(3)(d); SEC Rules r5(3)(d); Tax Rules r5(3)(d); WPAFC Rules r5(3)(d). »
23     See also: GRC Rules r16; HESC Rules r16; IAC Rules r15; Lands Rules r18; PC Rules r20; SEC Rules r16; Tax Rules r16; WPAFC Rules r16. »
24     Inner West London Assistant Deputy Coroner v Channel 4 Television Corporation (2007) Times 11 December. »
25     [2009] UKUT 283 (AAC) at [8]. »
26     R v B County Council ex p P [1991] 1 WLR 221 at 226. »
27     [1991] 1 WLR 221 at 227. »
28     CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [24]. »
29     Re W (children) (care proceedings: evidence) [2010] 1 WLR 701. »
30     [1991] 1 WLR 221 at 228 and 232–233. »
31     Re P (Witness Summons) [1997] 2 FLR 447 at 454. »
32     R v Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court ex p D [1997] 1 FLR 683. »
33     Re P (Witness Summons) [1997] 2 FLR 447 at 454. But in R v Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court ex p D [1997] 1 FLR 683 a summons was issued to a child of nine, subject to the condition that his suitability as a witness would be decided at the time he was due to give evidence. »
34     See also: GRC Rules r1(3); HESC Rules r1(3); IAC Rules r1(4); Lands Rules r18; PC Rules 1(3); SEC Rules r1(3); Tax Rules r1(3); WPAFC Rules r1(3). »
35     See: UTR r15(1)(e); GRC Rules r15(1)(g); HESC Rules r15(1)(e); IAC Rules r14(1)(e); Lands Rules r16(1)(e); PC Rules r18(1)(g); SEC Rules r15(1)(e); Tax Rules r15(1)(e); WPAFC Rules r15(1)(e). »
36     Society of Lloyd’s v Clementson (No 2) (1996) Times 29 February; CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [24]. »
37     CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [29]. »
38     CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [28]. »
39     CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [25] and [28]. »
40     CB v Suffok County Council [2010] UKUT 413 (AAC) at [26]. »
41     Khanna v Lovell White Durrant (a firm) [1995] 1 WLR 121. »
42     Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Management plc (No 1) [1993] 1 WLR 837 and 1372. »
43     See also: GRC Rules r1(3); HESC Rules r1(3); PC Rules 1(3); SEC Rules r1(3); Tax Rules r1(3); WPAFC Rules r1(3). »
44     Grant v Southwestern and County Properties Ltd [1975] Ch 185. »
45     Senior v Holdsworth ex p Independent Television News Ltd [1975] QB 23. »
46     See Lonrho plc v Fayed (No 4) [1994] QB 775. »
47     Robertson v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1994] 1 WLR 1393. »
48     Banking Act 1987 s82 and Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd (in liquidation) v Price Waterhouse (No 2) [1998] Ch 84. »
49     There are other exceptions, but they are unlikely to be relevant to a tribunal. »
Obtaining evidence
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